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Some Comments on Mr. Nader's Views
Carl Auerbach*
1. It is not clear whether Mr. Nader's attack is directed against
the law school of today as well as of yesterday. In any case, I
do not think that law schools in the period he describes were
or are today engaged in a "process of engineering the law student into corridor thinking and largely non-normative evaluation." Nor is such a process the unintended consequence of the
prevailing system of legal education. Certainly, today, it would
be very difficult to find many law professors who think that
public policy is not the law school's concern.
2. Mr. Nader is not warranted in generally describing "the mixing of the case method of study with the Socratic method of
teaching" as "a highly sophisticated form of mind control that
trades off breadth of vision and factual inquiry for freedom to
roam in an intellectual cage." The "Socratic method" actually
covers a great variety of methods used by individual teachers.
Many sins of omission and commission are undoubtedly hidden
under its cover. But it is also the vehicle for some brilliant
teaching. And the materials included in many current "casebooks" are so diverse that Dean Langdell would not recognize
his brainchild.
As I see it, the most important function of teaching on the
basis of "casebooks" is to give the student the materials he needs
to put him on a par with the teacher to the maximum extent
possible within the limits set by the student-teacher relationship
itself. At its best, then, this teaching method stimulates student
participation and discussion and accustoms students to solve
problems for themselves.
3. The content of the current law school curriculum is so rich
and the freedom to elect courses so extensive in the second and
third years that the "curriculum pecking order" to which Mr.
Nader refers simply does not exist. For example, the second and
third year curricula for the current academic year at the University of Minnesota Law School includes the following courses
and seminars in addition to those Mr. Nader would probably regard as "standard": The Child and the State, Criminal Procedure, Land Use Planning, Law and Medicine, Modern Social
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Legislation, Regulated Industries, Divorce Counseling, Arbitration, Government Housing Programs, Governmental Regulation of Banking, Law and Agricultural Economics (Pesticides),
Legal and Ethical Problems of Medical Practice, Legal and Political Conceptions of Equality, Natural Resources Law, Negotiation, Policy Problems in the Law of Divorce, Problems in State
and Local Finance, Problems of Consumer Credit, The Law and
Education of the Disadvantaged, Legal Problems in Minnesota
Public Affairs and Selected Problems in Federal and State Equal
Employment Opportunities Statutes. The first-year curriculum
includes required courses in the Legal Process and Constitutional Law. Even the "standard" courses in the first year are
undergoing significant internal transformation.
Law students, in fact, have difficult problems of choice and
law faculties have not succeeded in devising principles to construct a manageable curriculum that will reflect the continually
expanding areas of new law. It would be much more fruitful
to shift our attention from the law school curriculum to the
effect which the present system of bar examinations has on the
courses chosen by students.
4. Mr. Nader's most serious point is that law schools in the
past failed to "articulate a theory and practice of a just deployment of legal manpower" and that they should do so now. I
doubt this is the law school's business. We are dealing here with
individual motivation. "Comparatively few imaginations," Mr.
Justice Holmes once said, "are educated to aspire beyond money
and the immediate forms of power." While it is the law school's
function to educate law students to the values of freedom and
equality imbedded in our democratic legal order, it is not its
function to seek to allocate legal manpower in accordance with
the particular view of a majority of its faculty. I shudder to
think what the process of faculty selection would be like if this
became an avowed aim of the law school.
By their teaching, writing and behavior, individual professors influence individual students. But every teacher has an
obligation not to exercise this influence too directly, either by
way of support or opposition of choice in order not to diminish
the student's right and responsibility.
5. I am not impressed with the demands Mr. Nader tells us
young lawyers are making that the big firms give them more
free time, at the firm's expense, to engage in pro bono work.
Desiring the advantages of association with the big firms, these
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lawyers still seem to feel a need to allay their feelings that they
are doing something wrong by making all that money and being
close to all that power. So they make these demands. But
where is the self-sacrifice worthy of respect? I would be more
touched if a young man worked five or six days for his firm
and spent the sixth or seventh day in pro bono work or even
as an orderly in an inner city hospital ward. Nor do I see anything noble about "demands" from law students and young lawyers that others should contribute money for scholarships or pay
"reparations" to assist the legally deprived.
I am also concerned that this kind of dabbling with pro
bono work may take attention away from the responsibility of
the government at all levels of the federal structure to see to it
that all our people have adequate access to competent legal services. Let us seriously consider some "judicare" system.
6. This brings me to Mr. Nader's plea for more "basic" pro bono
work, which is premised on his conception of the lawyer as
champion of the "public interest." Mr. Nader ignores the difficulties of his conception and the long history of thought given
to it. This may be attributable to the fact that he was writing
for a magazine read by the general public and not by the profession. But oversimplification is not justified even when communicating with the general public on professional matters.
In an excellent little book discussing these problems some
years ago, Mr. Charles Horsky wrote:
We [Washington lawyers] have an obligation to do more than
tell clients how they can lawfully do what they want to do. I
do not refer only to the clients who want to urge positions so
outrageous that no lawyer could advocate them and still maintain his self-respect. We should go beyond that. The public
position of the bar suffers, and properly so, when it becomes
apparent that there are Washington lawyers who are quite
willing to ignore entirely the larger interests of the country and
the basic standards of decency in the process of stringing together sets of legal loopholes to achieve some inordinate advantage. Because this is an area in which canons of ethics
and Grievance Committees cannot operate is the more reason
why all lawyers should be alert to the implicit, as well as the
explicit, responsibilities which distinguish law as a profession,
not merely a highly technical trade.1
Most lawyers would generally agree with Mr. Horsky. But
suppose it is not a question of ignoring "the basic standards of
decency?"
"[B]y what warrant may lawyers judge their clients' goals
1. C. HoRsx, THE WASHINGTON LAwYER 140-41 (1952).
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illegitimate although legal, and impose their own views about
the path of virtue upon their clients? ' 2 What specialized
knowledge does the lawyer possess that entitles him to insist
that his views of the "public interest" shall prevail? What selfrespecting client would tolerate such arrogance? Of course the
bar has a collective responsibility to assure that all individual
and group interests or claims in the society are articulated. But
it is natural for every group to claim that what is good for it is
good for the country. It is the task of government to vindicate
the "public interest."
In short, I think Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering did nothing
wrong in negotiating a consent decree for their clients, the automobile manufacturers. If a consent decree in this case is against
the public interest, the Justice Department should not agree to it
and the federal district court should not approve it. But the
auto makers are entitled to have Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering
present their case for a consent decree. The picketing of their
offices, which Mr. Nader was reported in the press to have encouraged, 3 was disgraceful.
Big law firms can give only a narrow interpretation to pro
bono work-representing indigents and servicing the needs of
poor people on a case-by-case basis. If pro bono work is defined
in more "basic" terms, as Mr. Nader suggests, undesirable conflicts of interest will result.
7. Mr. Nader has performed many public services, not least of
which is his effort to realize the idea of the "public interest" law
firm. But here, too, there is a lurking misconception which may
jeopardize Mr. Nader's public service aims. No lawyer in such
a firm should be certain that he is representing the "public interest." He can do no more than represent a very significant
but nonetheless partial interest. This is a good deal and should
be appreciated by all. But issues of public policy generally turn
on which part of the public should be protected or the extent to
which, in a particular situation, it is more important to satisfy
the claims of people as consumers rather than as producers or
to sacrifice the claims of present generations in favor of future
generations. The people in a town that is in economic distress,
for example, may find that their interest in "clear water" comes
into conflict with their interest in jobs for their breadwinners.
2. Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors, 54
VA. L. REv. 617, 626 (1968).
3. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1969, at 30, cols. 3 & 4.
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The "public interest" will have to be determined by the lawmaking agencies themselves after also giving due considerations
to the claims of individuals and groups in the society whom Mr.
Nader-more power to him-may oppose.
This makes it difficult to comprehend why Mr. Nader sees
government as a hostile force to be combated by the "public
interest" lawyer. Why should not young lawyers seeking to
champion the public interest enter government service? Local
and state governments, even more than the federal government,
need to be revitalized, and this will not happen without the help
of lawyers. Until it happens, the efforts of Mr. Nader and his
fellow "public interest" lawyers will come to naught. True,
many local and state governments pay miserably and federal pay
does not compare with what can be earned in the big firms.
But then government service should have the extra attraction of
holding out the opportunity for self-sacrifice. I hope Mr. Nader
will not discourage young men and women from seizing this opportunity.

